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Chile has long been an important element in New
Mexico culture and cuisine. With the increasing popu-
larity of Mexican food in recent decades, nationwide
demand for chile has increased markedly. While chile is
widely grown in northern New Mexico gardens and
small plots, commercial production is concentrated in
the southern part of the state. Since chile harvest is labor
intensive, proximity to the large labor pool in El Paso/
Juarez has been a major factor in expanding production
first in Doña Ana County, and more recently, in Luna
County. Scarcity of harvest labor has been a major
factor inhibiting spread of chile production into the
Pecos Valley.
Periodic threats to labor availability and cost, such as
immigration reform and various labor laws, have
prompted efforts to mechanize chile harvest. There
have been many attempts to develop mechanical pepper
harvesters. However, peppers, generally, and even local
chiles, specifically, are very heterogeneous. Green, red,
jalapeño, cayenne, and specialty chile types each have
characteristics that affect harvest. Even different variet-
ies within one type may have markedly different char-
acteristics that affect machine harvesting. For example,
pods that grow either close to the main stem or out on the
branches can help or hinder mechanical harvest. Simi-
larly, uniform ripening facilitates machine harvest, while
an extended ripening period necessitates several pickings.
The purpose of this study was to estimate the impact
of increasing the minimum wage on chile production in
southern New Mexico. Will it spur mechanization? Will
it encourage increased chile imports from Mexico? Or,
are current production patterns likely to be unaffected?
The focus was on red chile and jalapeños, since these types
have been most amenable to mechanical harvest.
Background
U.S. pepper production ranges from sweet bell pep-
pers, which account for some 65% of total national
acreage, to tiny pungent piquins (Willhoit, et al 1990).
All types have traditionally been harvested by hand with
multiple pickings common. Multiple hand harvests add
up to very high labor requirements. Efforts to produce a
mechanical pepper harvester go back at least three
decades. In New Mexico, a few varieties of red chile and
jalapeños can be mechanically harvested very satisfac-
torily, at least under optimal field conditions. Other
varieties and other types of chile present substantial
problems, such as excessive damage to the fruit and/or
plant, too many left in the field, or too much trash taken
with the harvest. In spite of these problems, several
observers anticipate a rapid spread of mechanical har-
vest if there’s a substantial change in labor’s cost or
availability. The 1996 proposed hike of about 21% in
the minimum wage will significantly increase hand-
harvest costs.
Mechanization is a complex process requiring simul-
taneous manipulation of diverse elements. Many differ-
ent mechanical configurations have been developed and
tested (Marshall, Esch, and Dragt 1986; Willhoit,
Duncan, and Wells 1990). Every machine has numerous
possible adjustments of openings, speed, angles, and
other variables, which must be adapted to variety and
field conditions. Mechanical harvest almost invariably
takes in more trash along with the peppers than hand
harvest. Removing the trash somewhere along the pro-
cessing line is often difficult and expensive. Varieties
differ markedly in their adaptability to machine harvest
and thus become an important variable in the equation.
Various field conditions such as weeds also influence
harvest. For mechanization to be successful, all the
critical variables must be managed simultaneously.
Successful mechanization would involve a coordi-
nated effort between plant breeder and engineer, which
has not occurred. Recent chile breeding efforts have
focused on disease resistance, yield, taste, and color, but
not on the qualities necessary for mechanical picking.
Spawned by an outcry over the adverse impact on
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farmworkers of mechanizing lettuce and tomato har-
vests, federal restrictions were placed on research tech-
nology that would ultimately displace labor (Schmitz
and Seckler, 1970). These restrictions have effectively
separated genetic research, much of which is publicly
supported, and the mechanization efforts, most of which
are private.
The farm labor situation is always in a state of flux.
The Special Agricultural Worker provision of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) legal-
ized a large surplus of unskilled workers in El Paso/
Juarez. Moreover, the labor pool is being continuously
renewed by new immigrants. Migration is a well-estab-
lished behavior pattern woven into the social fabric of
many Mexican villages. Children in many villages now
grow up expecting to migrate, because family members
and friends are already in the United States. These
connections provide introductions to employers and
assistance with housing, and otherwise greatly reduce
migration’s difficulty and risk. If documents are needed,
documents are obtained. The shortage of agricultural
workers expected by many farmers has yet to material-
ize even 10 years after IRCA. However, one producer
who keeps detailed records on such matters cites a 33%
decline in worker productivity during this period, as
measured by the pounds of chile harvested per worker
per day.  His explanation is that young able-bodied
males have moved out of agricultural work, leaving
behind less productive older males and females.
Previous studies have encountered few native-born
farmworkers in New Mexico (Eastman 1991, 1992).
Some, but not all, immigrants are able to move into more
stable urban employment. Children of immigrants may
accompany their parents to the harvest fields when they
are young. However, by the time they finish school they
have a command of English and other skills and are able
to move out of agriculture. Much farm work is per-
formed outdoors in hot and dirty conditions. Even those
who like working in the fields find the seasonality of
agriculture leaves them unemployed for substantial
periods. Farmworkers chronically complain about the
instability of employment. Hourly earnings may be
good but annual earnings leave most families qualified
for Food Stamps. It is important to emphasize that
agricultural work did not make immigrant workers
poor. These people were poor before they entered the
farm labor pool and that is why they were willing to
tolerate conditions native-born workers did not. For
many workers, agricultural employment provides a
transition while they learn English and gain skills for
more desirable or stable urban employment. Numerous
attempts to legislate improvements in the working and
living conditions of farmworkers have been less than
successful. A chronic surplus of labor fed by a continu-
ous stream of immigrants simply overwhelms the laws
designed to improve farm workers’ situations and dis-
courages mechanization.
In the past, the U.S.-Mexico boundary was a bound-
ary between very low wages and high underemploy-
ment south of the border and better economic prospects
to the north. The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment is substantially diminishing the sharpness of the
U.S.-Mexico border. To a much greater extent than in
the past, immigrants who crossed the border in 1996 to




Since 1949, nominal federal minimum wages in-
creased from 75¢ to $5.15 (fig. 1). The most recent hike
was signed into law on August 20, 1996 and has two
increments. A 50¢ increase took effect October 1, 1996,
with the final 40¢ increase planned for September 1,
1997 (Public Law 104-188). Nominal increases have
seemed dramatic. In the short-term, the recent 90¢
increase represents a 21% real increase in labor costs. A
budget shock of this magnitude could result in shifts in
production decisions. Producers’ decisions in 1995 were
made on the basis of a $4.25 wage, while 1997 produc-
tion decisions will be made on a $5.15 minimum wage.
Although some piece rate earnings and some workers’
wages were well above the $4.25 minimum, some
producers estimate (and we assume) that all chile labor
costs will rise 21% from 1995 to 1997. A shock to
production budgets of this magnitude could become an
impetus to either mechanization or production migration.
When the minimum wage is deflated by the Con-
sumer Price Index to real terms a very different pattern
emerges. In terms of buying power, the real minimum
wage peaked 30 years ago in 1966 and has declined
steadily ever since. There has been a spate of federal
laws to protect and improve working conditions, hous-
ing, and farmworkers’ incomes (Runyan, 1992). In the
agricultural sector, stagnating farmworkers’ earnings
reflect an over-abundance of labor, resulting from the
continuing migration of workers from Mexico and Cen-
tral America (Martin, p. 27, 1995). The abundance of
workers has overwhelmed legislative attempts to im-
prove working conditions and incomes of farmworkers.
Imports from Mexico
Data on chile imports through Columbus and Santa
Teresa, New Mexico, provide a good indicator of trends
in import competition to southern New Mexico produc-
tion (table 1). In 1994, the first year of NAFTA imple-
mentation, imports were reduced because one large3
cayenne processor ceased buying in Mexico due to
difficulties in dealing with the government. However, in
1995, imports expanded markedly as U.S. processors
and producers made connections in Mexico and took
advantage of lower tariffs. Overall, the trend shows a
substantial increase in imports, which corroborates re-
ports from processors and producers.
Fig. 1. Nominal and real minimum wage rates by year enacted.
* In the indicated years, the federal minimum wage was increased. Real wage rates were calculated using the Consumer Price Index base year of 1982.
Source: Internet <www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/miniwage>
Table  1. Annual chile imports from Mexico through









Source: Personal communications from Aaron Miller and William
Coppenbarger, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, September 1996.
42% of total production costs for jalapeños and red chile
in 1995, and this is expected to increase to just under
50% in 1997. Mechanical harvesting reduced the labor
fraction to less than 10% for red and 6.5% for jalapeños
in 1995. In 1997, the fraction rises to 11.6% and 7.8%,
respectively.
Not much data on machine use in southern New
Mexico exists, but observers generally agreed that ma-
chine harvesting declined in 1995 and 1996. On October 9,
1996, seven McClendon pepper harvesters and other
equipment were sold at auction in Doña Ana, just north
of Las Cruces. The newest harvester, with only 390
operating hours, sold for $36,000, which was only about
one-third of the new price of about $100,000. Older
machines went for as little as $14,000. These machines
are the most commonly used machines and were all in
field-ready condition. The substantially discounted prices
indicate a very weak demand.
Table 2. Labor as a percent of production cost for hand
and mechanical chile harvest in southern New
Mexico, 1995 and 1997.*
Hand Mechanical
1995 1997 1995 1997
Red chile 41.22% 49.07% 9.71% 11.56%
Jalapeños 42.57% 47.16% 6.54%  7.79%
*Labor cost divided by total production cost.
Costs and Returns of Chile Production
These analyses are based on crop cost and return
estimates developed by Libbin, et al (1996). The bud-
gets were modified with more detailed data for both
hand and machine harvest operations. Hand harvesting
is labor intensive (table 2). Labor costs accounted for4
Mechanical harvesting gathers more trash, which
must be removed in a separate cleaning operation after
harvest and before processing. Cleaning requires un-
loading, running the peppers over cleaning rollers, and
reloading onto a truck. This extra handling results in
damage to the pods and decreased quality. Some proces-
sors required hand picking as a condition of their con-
tracts in 1996.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that crop cost
and return data are arithmetic means of data that in
reality vary widely. Thus, while they are unlikely to
correspond exactly to an individual situation, estimated
budgets still provide a reasonably accurate assessment of
the whole sector.
The estimated difference between machine harvesting
and hand harvesting costs for red chile, before the wage
increase in 1995 and after the increase in 1997, is dra-
matic—almost $1,000 per acre (tables 3 and 4). Figures of
this magnitude are frequently cited by proponents of mecha-
nized harvest. However, these costs only get red chile out
of the field. In the case of mechanized harvest, we estimate
only 85% of the crop actually gets into the bin. Further-
more, since there is often a substantial amount of trash
in mechanically harvested chile, there is often an addi-
tional cleaning cost estimated at $85 in 1995 and $102
in 1997. In spite of lower gross returns due to the 15%
yield loss, the estimated net operating profit is greater
for machine harvest ($814 per acre) than for hand
harvest ($326 per acre in 1997) (table 5). When the variety
is amenable to machine harvest and field conditions are
good, mechanical harvest can be more profitable.
The situation is somewhat different for jalapeños.
First of all, the estimated yield is so much higher for
jalapeños (28,000 lb/acre) than for red chile (4,000 lb/acre),
because the former is customarily quoted on a wet basis,
while the latter is customarily quoted on a dry basis
(table 6). The cost advantage for using the machine with
jalapeños was about $1,800 per acre in 1995 and about
$2,200 per acre in 1997 (tables 6 and 7). Cleaning costs
and yield losses of 15% result in reducing the differen-
tial in operating profits for machine and hand harvest in
both years. The estimated advantage is $492 per acre for
machine harvesting in 1995 and a $796 advantage for
the machine in 1997. Thus, the increase in wage in-
creases the estimated machine advantage by about $300
per acre (table 8).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
If these estimates are accurate, why would producers
not pick red chile with a machine? Many farmers do not
like to see chile left in the field, and machines generally
leave at least some. Some processors stipulate hand-
picked in their contracts to avoid damaged pods. Fre-
quently, field conditions aren’t optimal. Also, other-
wise desirable varieties aren’t harvested well by machine.
Machines are expensive to buy and aren’t always reli-
able. Custom operators may not be available for a timely
harvest, and there is always some inertia involved in
changing ingrained production practices. Finally, we
suggest that the specter of lower production costs in
Mexico hangs over New Mexico chile fields. Many
processors and producers concerned about higher labor
costs are looking to move production south rather than
mechanize.
Jalapeño estimates are similar to those of red chile.
The major difference is that jalapeño production is
much more profitable than red chile, regardless of how
it is harvested. Compared to red chile, a somewhat
greater percentage of jalapeños are harvested mechani-
cally. Even more rapid mechanization could have oc-
curred for the same reasons as mentioned for red chile.
So why don’t producers switch from red chile to
jalapeños? For one thing, most chile is produced under
contract with processors. Few producers are willing to
risk the substantial production investment without an
assured market. Another answer is that red chile is
overripe green chile, and green chile is profitable. Much
of the red is what is left over after one or two pickings
of green, or perhaps, the total production of a field for
which a green market couldn’t be found. In that sense,
the red budget is somewhat misleading. However, for
comparing hand and machine costs and returns, the
Table 3. Estimated per-acre costs of machine
harvesting red chile in Doña Ana County, New
Mexico, 1995 and 1997.
1995 1997
Cost Hourly Hours Hourly Hours
item rate ($) per acre** Cost ($) rate ($) per acre** Cost ($)
Labor 5.00 5.3 26.50 6.10 5.3 32.33
Fuel 1.81 5.3 9.59 1.86 5.3 9.83
Repairs 1.23 5.3 6.52 1.26 5.3 6.68
Payment* 41.93 5.3 222.23 41.93 5.3 222.23
Total cost
per acre $264.84 $271.07
* Machine costs are based on 76 days of use per year and five annual
payments on the purchase price plus 10% interest.
** Based on 1.5 acres per 8-hour day.
Table 4. Estimated per-acre costs of hand harvesting
red chile in Doña Ana County, New Mexico,
1995 and 1997.
1995 1997
Cost Per Buckets Hours Per Buckets Hours
item bucket per acre* per acre bucket per acre* per acre
Labor $0.78 1333.3 156.86 $0.95 1333.3 156.86
Total cost
per acre $1,039.97 $1,268.77
*Based on 4,000 lb/acre dry wt, 3 lb/bucket, 8.5 buckets per hour.5
Table 7. Estimated per-acre costs of machine harvest-
ing jalapeños in Doña Ana County, New Mexico,
1995 and 1997*.
1995 1997
Cost Hourly Hours Hour Hours
item rate per acre** Cost rate per acre** Cost
Labor $5.00 5.3 $26.50 $6.10 5.3 $32.33
Fuel $1.81 5.3 $9.59 $1.86 5.3 $9.86
Repairs $1.23 5.3 $6.52 $1.26 5.3 $6.68
Payment $41.93 5.3 $222.23 $41.93 5.3 $222.23
Total cost
per acre $264.84 $271.10
*Machine costs are based on 76 days of use per year and five annual
payments on the purchase price plus 10% interest.
** Based on 3.5 acres per 8-hour day.
NMSU cost and return estimates are appropriate. Green
chile is not considered in this analysis because attempts
to mechanize that harvest are much less promising.
When technical and economic factors are considered
together, it is difficult to be sanguine about any substan-
tial increase in mechanical harvest adoption in the near
future. The dynamic change in chile production in the
mid-1990s appears to be the movement into Mexico and
not to mechanization. Chile imports through Columbus
and Santa Teresa, New Mexico were used because
imports have and will continue to compete directly with
southern New Mexico production. The import trends
strongly suggest they are likely to increase. These data
are consistent with anecdotal evidence of increasing
processor interest in Mexico. A number of the larger,
well-capitalized, more aggressive producers who would
normally be leaders in mechanization are, instead, look-
ing to Mexico.
Wage differentials are only one factor, albeit a major
one, in expanding Mexican chile production and ex-
ports. The minimum wage for Mexican farm workers is
$5.00 per day, less than the new hourly minimum wage
on the other side of the border. Electricity is 3 cents per
Kilowatt-hour, less than one-quarter of the cost in
southern New Mexico. This reduces irrigation costs
where ground water is used. NAFTA is lowering tariffs
and facilitating chile imports into the United States.
Yields tend to be higher when production first moves
into a new chile-growing area due to low pathogen
populations. Some production factors like machinery
costs may be equal to or higher than United States’
costs. Some observers predict production to initially
Table 6. Estimated per-acre costs of hand harvesting
jalapeños in Doña Ana County, New Mexico,
1995 and 1997.
1995 1997
Cost Per Buckets Hours Per Buckets Hours
item bucket per acre* per acre bucket per acre* per acre
Labor $1.68 1,217.39 304.34 $2.05 1,217.39 304.34
Total cost
per acre $2,045.22 $2,495.16
*Based on 28,000 lb/acre, 23 lb/bucket, 4 buckets per hour.
Table 5. Comparison of estimated per-acre cost and returns for hand- and machine-harvested red chile
 in Doña Ana County, New Mexico for production years 1995 and 1997.
Hand harvest Machine harvest
1995 1997 1995 1997
Gross returns* $2,080.00 $2,600.00 $1,768.00 $2,210.00
Expenses
Purchased inputs $467.05 $478.73 $467.05 $478.73




Additional cleaningxxx $85.00 $102.00
Post-harvest operations $3.83 $3.93 $3.83 $3.93
Overhead expenses $192.48 $197.29 $192.48 $197.29
Total operating expenses $2,020.78 $2,274.10 $1,330.65 $1,378.41
Net operating profit per acre $59.22 $325.90 $437.35 $813.59
*Gross returns based on 4,000 lb yield at $0.52/lb price for hand harvest. For machine harvest, a 15% yield loss at 3,400 lb at $0.52/lb for 1995. For
1997, the yield is the same, but the price per lb is $0.65.
**Numbers from table 1 and table 2. 1997 numbers have been adjusted using an average CPI of 2.5%.
xxxCleaning cost estimated at $0.025/lb in 1995 and $0.03/lb in 1997.6
Table 8. Comparison of estimated per-acre cost and returns for hand- and machine-harvested jalapeños in Doña Ana
County, New Mexico for production years 1995 and 1997.
Hand harvest Machine harvest
1995 1997 1995 1997
Gross returns* $4,620.00 $4,760.00 $3,927.00 $4,046.00
Expenses:
Purchased inputs $467.05 $478.73 $467.05 $478.73




Additional cleaningxxx $595.00 $714.00
Post-harvest operations $3.83 $3.93 $3.83 $3.93
Overhead operations $192.48 $197.29 $192.48 $197.29
Total operating expenses $3,026.03 $3,500.50 $1,840.65 $1,990.44
Net operating profit per acre $1,593.97 $1,259.50 $2,086.35 $2,055.56
*Gross returns based on 28,000 lb yield at $0.165/lb price for hand harvest. For machine harvest, a 15% yield loss at 23,800 lb at $0.165/lb for 1995. For
1997, the same yield, but price is $0.17.
**Numbers from table 4 and table 5. 1997 numbers adjusted by an average CPI of 2.5%.
xxxCleaning cost estimated at $0.025/lb in 1995 and $0.03/lb in 1997.
move to Mexico, but then to move back to the United
States once bureaucratic and other difficulties become
manifest. A detailed comparison of United States and
Mexican production costs is well beyond this study’s
scope. We rely instead on recent import trends and the
judgement of key informants in chile production and
processing.
In conclusion, in late 1996, it appears more likely that
we’ll see production move south of the border rather
than an increase in mechanical harvesting. Despite all
the development work that has been done on pepper
harvesters, a significant breakthrough appears unlikely
until there is a coordinated effort between plant breeders
and engineers. That coordination has been effectively
discouraged by federal restrictions on developing labor-
displacing technology. As production moves south,
Mexican immigrants will find less seasonal work in
New Mexico fields. More would-be immigrants will be
able to stay in Mexico and harvest chile under those
working conditions and wages. With NAFTA, the prin-
cipal competition for jobs is coming from Mexico. If it
were feasible, mechanization could become the U.S.
worker’s ally by keeping U.S. production economically
competitive. It may be coming down to a few, relatively
well-paid U.S. jobs in support of a mechanized industry
versus more jobs in Mexico at less desirable wage rates
and working conditions. U.S. producers and processors
who are able to develop relationships in Mexico stand to
benefit from the new opportunities. U.S. producers and
processors have technical and managerial experience.
Those with access to capital and ability to work in
Mexico should be able to operate on either side of the
border. Smaller, less-mobile producers, in particular,
are likely to feel squeezed by the competition from
cheaper imports. Thus, workers in Mexico, plus some
U.S. and Mexican producers and processors, should
benefit from the changing situation. Farm workers al-
ready established in the U.S., plus producers and pro-
cessors without access to capital or ability to work in
Mexico, will lose.
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